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LAW AND EQUITY IN UPPER CANADA.
"We ought not to think of common law ana equity as of
two rival systems. Equity was not a self-sufficient system, at
every point it presupposed the existence of common law. Common law was a self-sufficient system. I mean this: that if the
legislature had passed a short act saying 'Equity is hereby abolished,' we might still have got on fairly well; in some respects
our law would have been barbarous, unjust, absurd, but still the
great elemenary rights, the right to immunity from violence, the
right to one's good name, the rights of ownership and possession
would have been decently protected and contract would have
been enforced. On the other hand had the legislature said, 'Common law is hereby abolished,' this decree if obeyed would have
meant anarchy. At every point equity presupposed the existence
of common law. Take the case of a trust. It's of no use for
Equity to say that A is a trustee of Blackacre for B, unless there
be some court that can say that A is the owner of Blackacre.
Equity without common law would have been a castle in the air,
an impossibility."'
The supposititious equity-less England suggested by Maitland to his students in the foregoing words has an actual and
curious parallel, of special interest to the, student, in the history
'F. W. Maitland, Equity and the Forms of Action, Cambridge (xgog),
p. 1g.

2

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

of the old province of Upper Canada, the inhabitants of which
for nearly fifty years "got on fairly well" with the common law
of England-and never a chancellor to be appealed to 'for the
love of God or in the way of charity.'
The Upper Canadian Statute of 1792 which introduced the
laws of England as the rule for the decision of all matters of controversy relative to property- and civil rights, also provided that
all matters relative to testimony and legal proof in the investigation of fact, and the forms thereof, hik the several courts of law
and equity within the province, should be regulated by the rules
2
of evidence established in England.
Although the word "equity" occurs in the statute, there was
no indication of any intention on the part of the legislature to
recognize equity as a rule for the decision of any question of
property and civil rights, nor was the legislature, when it established superior courts for the administration of justice, in any
haste to confer equitable jurisdiction upon them.
Mr. Chief Justice Robinson wrote in 1846 :3
"Courts of Request4 were organized for the trial of small
causes, on the same principle as the courts of conscience in
England; and these were not held to the strict rules of the
common law; but with this exception, if it can be called one,
there was absolutely no court whatever authorized to proceed
otherwise than according to the common law. No court of
'32 G. 3, c. '. Under the authority of the Statute 31 G. 3, c. 31, of the
British Parliament commonly known as the Constitutional Act of 179!, the
old Province of duebec was divided into two Provinces known as Upper
Canada and Lower Canada respectively. Upper Canada comprised what is
now the southerly portion of the Province of Ontario. The statute referred
to in the text was the first statute passed by the first parliament of Upper
Canada at its first session, held at the provincial capital Newark (now
Niagara) in 1792. Its effect was to supersede the French Canadian law
which had theretofore been the rule for the decision of matters of controversy relative to property and civil rights, and to substitute the English
law as of the 15th of October, 1792.
'Simpson v. Smyth (1846), i U. C. E. & A., at pp. 57, 66.
'These Courts of Requests were originally established by the Upper Canadian Statute 32 G. 3. c. 6. Each Court was to be held by two or more justices of the peace, who were directed to decide "as to them shall seem just
in Law and Equity." They here afterwards superseded by Division Courtsthe predecessors of the present courts df that name. The judge of a Division
Court may "make such o'rM. or judgment as appears to him just and agreeable to equity and good conscience.. In England the Court of Requests
was a minor court of equity which flourished during the Tudor and early
Stuart period. See Holdsworth's History Eng. Law, Vol. I, p. 207.
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equity was created, and no provision made for the exercise of
an equitable jurisdiction, in regard to any one matter that belongs peculiarly to equity, nor any assurance held out by the
legislature while they were introducing the Engligh law, in the
year 1792, nor for more than thirty years afterwards, that there
ever would be a court in Upper Canada authorized to administer what in England is called equity.
"It was well known that in the British West India Islands
and some other ancient British possessions, there were courts
of equity exercising their.authority on no other foundation
than that the governor was by common law chancellor, in virtue
of his custody of the great seal; but it seems to have been generally conceded that since the Bill of Rights, i Win. and Mary,
the Crown cannot by the exercise of its prerogative merely,
erect any jurisdiction with power to judge, otherwise than
according to the course of the common law; and it has not of
late years been attempted to do so. Even in this province the
Governor had, as to some purposes, been considered as invested
with the authority and jurisdiction of chancellor in consequence

of his custody of the great seal, but never in regard to the exercise of any equitable jurisdiction."'
The Provincial Act of 1794 which established the Court of
King's Bench for Upper Canada,' conferred upon it a jurisdiction
equivalent to that then possessed by the Court of King's Bench,
the Court of Common Bench, or in matters which regarded the
King's revenue, by the Court of Exchequer in England, but there
was no mention of any equitable jurisdiction. Until 1837 the
King's Bench remained the only superior court in the Province,
and in the reports of cases decided by it there is to be found comparatively little suggestion of the existence of any such thing as
equity.
Obviously no application was to be made to the King's Bench
for any relief of a distinctively equitable nature. There was no
jurisdiction to enforce trusts, to grant injunctions, to decree specific performance, to compel discovery or to give relief against
'Mr. Justice Riddell has drawn my attention to the fact that in 1823
William Dummer Powell, C. J., against whom one Alexander .Wood had
obtained a verdict, actually applied to the governor in his capacity as chancellor asking him to issue a writ directing the judge of assize to seal a bill
of exceptions. The jurisdiction of the chancellor being questioned, Powell
withdrew his application.
34 G. 3, c. 2: an Act to establish a Superior Court of Civil and Criminal
Jurisdiction and to regulate the Court of Appeal.

4

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

legal proceedings prosecuted contrary to equity and good conscience, nor any machinery to take accounts or to supervise the
administration of estates.
In 1827 in a case in which a purchaser at a sheriff's sale
sought to have the sale and the covenant for payment of the purchase money set aside on the ground that the sale was unfair and
that a good title could not be made, it was unsuccessfully argued
on the applicant's part that the sale, having been made by an officer of the court, was sufficiently under its control to authorize
an equitable interference, particularly as there was no court of
chancery to which the purchaser could apply.'
In Doe dem. Pell v. Mitchener,8 A being seised of real estate
conveyed to B and died, and A's heir conveyed the same premises
to C who, when he purchased, had notice of B's deed. C's deed
was registered before B's deed. It was held that B's deed was
invalid as against C's deed under the provincial act 35 G. 3, c. 5, s.
2. By this act it was provided in effect that after the confirmation
of land to any person by grant from the Crown under the great
seal of the province, a memorial of aiiy-d--d or conveyance of
such land might be registered, and that any deed or conveyance
made after a memorial was so registered, of any part of the land
contained in such registered memorial, should be adjudged fraudulent and void against a subsequent purchaser or mortgagee, for
valuable consideration, unless a memorial thereof should be registered in the manner prescribed by ihe act, before a -memorial
of the deed or conveyance under which such subsequent purchaser
or mortgagee claimed, should be registered. The effect of the
statute was to vest the legal estate in the subsequent purchaser
whose deed had been registered first. Plainly, however, the prior
purchaser would have been entitled to relief in equity against the
subsequent purchaser with notice, as indeed has been held in later
cases under a similar statute, 9 but in the absence of equitable jurisdiction the court could not refuse to give effect to the legal title.
'Wood v. Leeming (827), Taylor, 463. The grounds of the application
are differently stated in the headnote and in the body of the report respectively.
(1831) Draper, 47.
'See Rose v. Peterkin (i885), x3 Can. S. C. R. 677, at pp. 7o4 f.
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It appears from some other cases reported in Draper's Reports that the court was sometimes embarrassed in the border
land between equity and law by the lack of equitable jurisdiction.
In one case where a sale of land had been partly performed, the
court succeeded only with difficulty in finding a sufficient memorandum in writing under the Statute of Frauds, there being no
jurisdiction to give effect to the equitable doctrine of part performance.10 In another case decided in the same year the court
was at great pains to find common law as distinguished from
equitable authority to show that the Statute of Frauds is not to
11
be allowed to be used as a cloak for fraud.
12
The judgments in the case of Doe dem. Jones v. Capreol,
contain an interesting discussion of the circumstances in which a
court of law and a court of equity respectively may relieve against
fraud. Robinson, C. J., said :13
"It is most important for us, much more than it can be in
England, to ascertain as clearly as possible what are the cases
which a court of law can take cognizance of-and what the
cases which can receive no relief except in equity-and for this
plain reason, that we are absolutely without the means of exercising an equitable jurisdiction, having no court of equity of any
kind or for any purpose. Those frauds, therefore, which equity
alone can relieve against, must be successful; and consequently
if this court of common law, when it has the power to relieve
against frauds, were to decline the exercise of that power, and
upon the ground merely that equity is the more proper or more
usual or more convenient jurisdiction in such cases, then it
would follow that justice would be denied, and for an insufficient reason, because if a suitor can legally receive redress at
our hands, it would be illegal as well as vain to refer him, upon
any ground of expediency or usage, to a tribunal which does
not exist.
"This will not be disputed on the one hand, and it must be
as readily conceded on the other that a court of common law,
confined as this is expressly to the power and jurisdiction of the
superior courts of common law in England, cannot legally go
one .step further than those courts have the power to go upon
Rochleau v. Bidwell (i83z), Draper, 345.
Kilborn v. Forester (183i). Draper, 332.
"(1835) 4 U. C. 0. S. 22.
'

"Ibid., at pp. 236, 237.
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any pretence of hardship, or in consequence of any defects of
our judicial establishments. We may in some cases interpose,
where a court of common law in England, in the exercise of its
discretion, merely would refer the party to another course-that
is, we may do what they frequently may not choose to do; but
we have no authority to do anything which they cannot do."
The law of mortgage afforded the most conspicuous illustration of the inconvenient result of the absence of any court with
equitable jurisdiction. The relation of mortgagor and mortgagee
was governed by the common law as modified by statute. By the
common law if the mortgagor did not perform the condition of
the mortgage the estate of the mortgagee became absolute. If the
mortgagor gave up possession the mortgagee obtained at least a
good possessory title which there was no law to disturb. 14 The mortgagor could not file a bill to redeem and the mortgagee was free
to deal with the land as his own. If the mortgagor refused to
give up possession the mortgagee was driven to an action of
ejectment, a power of sale not being usually provided for. In
such an action the British Statute 7 G. 2, C.20, had provided that
the mortgagor might pay or bring into court the principal, interest
and costs, and become entitled to a reconveyance of the mortgaged
estate. So long as the mortgagor remained in possession this
statute afforded to him to some extent the same protection as a
court of"equity could have given him. The bringing of the action
operated as effectual notice that the mnortgagee insisted upon
either his money or his estate. If the mortgagor did not take advantage of the statute and pay the money, the mortgagee would
get possession and practically the same status at law as if he, had
foreclosed in equity, the possible difference being that he got a
speedier remedy than he would have got in equity. The statute
could, however, be taken advantage of ohly if there were no accounts to be investigated and no "disputed payment, and might
therefore not cover some cases of hdrdship. If the mortgage.
debt was not paid on the day, the mortgagee could bring an action
of ejectment and then the mortgagor could get back his estate
'

Smyth v. Simpson (1859),

4>

7 Moo. P. C. 2o5, 5 Grant, 1o4.
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only if he admitted the sum to be due which the mortgage was
given to secure and paid or brought into court that sum. 5 .
On the other hand the inability to get any judicial declaration of title on the mortgagor's default was doubtless a source of
perplexity to the mortgagee. He had no means of guarding against
the equity of redemption which slumbered in the minds of solicitors
familiar with English books or to which effect might possibly be
given under an equitable jurisdiction to be created in the future.
It seems to have been not unusual for the mortgagee, after the
mortgagor's default, to obtain judgment on the covenant and
cause the mortgagor's interest in the land to be sold under a writ

of fieri facias.1
This ill advised attempt to sell under legal process an interest
which in the absence of equitable jurisdiction had no real existence, and which in any case was not recognized at common law
and therefore could not be affected by legal process, was at an
early date held to be inoperative, but so late as 1846 it formed the
subject of an elaborate argument,' 7 and the attempt was doubtless
due to the desire of the perplexed mortgagee to give to his title
the sanction of some judicial proceeding. The sale under writ of
fieri facias, however inoperative as a legal transfer of a supposed
equity of redemption, might plausibly be urged as a circumstance
"Doe dem. McKenzie v. Rutherford (1844), I U. C. P 172. A hard
case, because it appeared that the mortgage debt had probably been paid,
but the accounts were disputed.
" The right of a creditor in Upper Canada, in place of issuing a writ
of elegit, to issue a writ of feri facias against the lands of his debtor was
based upon the British Statute 5 G. 2, c. 7, entitled "an Act for the more
easy recovery of debts in his majesty's plantations and colonies in America,"
by which the real property of a debtor became liable to be seized, extended,
sold or disposed of in the same manner as personal estate. The result was
that lands became assets in the hands of an executor for the satisfaction of
debts, so that to a plea of plene administravit the plaintiff might reply lands.
See Gardiner v. Gardiner (1832), 2 U. C. 0. S. .554; in the judgment the
earlier cases are reviewed, and at page 581 the practice in the Province in
the case of an execution, either against the original debtor or against his
personal representative, is explained. It was in early days irregular to issue
a ficri facias against lands until after the return of the execution against
goods, Doe dem. Spafford v. Brown (1833), 3 U. C. 0. S. 92. but this rule
was changed by the Statute 3i V. c. 25. It was doubtful whether the right
to the remedy by elegit was not taken away, and the fleri facias did not bind
the land until the delivery of the writ to the sheriff, Doe dem. Mcintosh v.
Mcdonell (1835), 4 U. C. 0. S. x9g.The land could not be sold within less
than twelve months after the delivery of the writ to the sheriff.
'Simpson v. Smyth (1846), 1 U. C. E. & A., at pp. 41 ff.
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in the mortgagee's favour in the event of the mortgagor's afterwards endeavoring to redeem if a court should be established with
equitable jurisdiction, or might be regarded as a sale by the mortgagee for the benefit of the mortgagor with a view to realizing
the encumbrance and returning the excess to the mortgagor."'
In the year 1834 the first allusion was made in the statutes
of Upper Canada to a mortgagor's equity of redemption.
The
Statute 4 W. 4, c. 16, contained a provision for giving to a certificate of payment of the mortgage money, when registered, all
the effect of a release of the mortgage and of a reconveyance of
the estate, and it was thought prudent to add a proviso that such
certificate, if given after the expiration of the period within
which the mortgagor had a right in cquity to redeem, should not
have the effect of defeating any title other than a title remaining
vested in the mortgagee or his heirs, executors and administrators.
By this the legislature seems to have apprehended that otherwise a
mortgagee, after acquiring an estate which ought to be held absolute in equity as well as at law and after transferring such estate
to some other party, might, by receiving the mortgage money and
giving a certificate, defeat the estate of the purchaser."' In the
same year the legislature passed the Act 4 W. 4, c. r, adopting
with some modifications many of the improvements in the law of
real property which had lately been made in England upon the
reconmendation of commissioners. In this act mention is made
in several clauses of equitable interests and estates as distinguished
from legal estates, and there are provisions in respect of each, corresponding with those contained in the English legislation. The
limitation of twenty years is adopted with regard-to any suits in
equity as well as in actions at law, with a proviso (Section ThirtyFive) such as the English statute contains, "that nothing in this
Act contained shall be deemed to interfere with any rule or jur"Ibid., at -page z92. After the establishment of a court of equity the law
was amended by 12 V., c. 73, so as to render an equity of redemption saleable under execution. Before the amendment if the mortgage was merely
for a term of years-even one thousand years-the reversion might be sold
and would carry with it the equity of redemption. Wightman v. Fields
(x872), ig Grant, 559, 565.
"Robinson, C. J., in Simpson v. Smyth (z846), i U. C. E. & A. 57 ff.;
cf. pp. 6r, go-9r, xiS.
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isdiction of Courts of Equity, in refusing relief on the ground of
acquiescence or otherwise, to any person whose right to bring a
suit may not be barred by virtue of this Act." The section of the
English act respecting the limitation of time for the assertion of a
mortgagor's rights is very closely followed, and at the end of the
Forty-Third Section, in which provision is made limiting the time
for suing at law or in equity for any mortgage money or for any
legacy, there is a proviso, "that in respect to persons now entitled
to an equity of redemption, or to any legacy, the right to bring an
action or to pursue a remedy for the same, shall not be deemed to
be extinguished or barred by lapse of time, until the expirationof

five years from the time that an equitablejurisdictionshall be established in this province, cind in the exercise of its powers; provided that shall happen within ten years from the passing of this
20
Act."
In x837 the legislature passed a statute authorizing the appointment of two additional judges for the Court of King's
Bench. 21 In the same year was passed the statute commonly
known as the Chancery Act,2 2 which for the first time afforded the
means of enforcing equitable rights in Upper Canada for any
purpose or to any extent.
The subject-matter of these two acts had already been before the legislature for some years. The following is an extract
from a despatch dated the 9th of April, 1827, from the Secretary
of State for the Colonies to Sir Peregrine Maitland, LieutenantGovernor of the Province:
"The rapid growth of the population, and the consequent
increase in the number of commercial and other transactions in
4he province, must be met, not only by a proportionate increase
in the number of the Judges, but perhaps also by an enlargement of their jurisdiction. I understand that at present there
is no tribunal in the country discharging the functions of a
Court of Equity, and that there is consequently a failure of justice in those numerous and most important cases which belong
exclusively to courts of that nature. In the probable advance'
"The italics are not in the original statute.

'n7 W. 4, c. z. The court had theretofore consisted of the Chief Justice of Upper Canada and two puisne judges.
a7 W. 4. c. 2.
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of this province, the want of a tribunal competent to execute
trusts, and to protect the property of infants, must be felt as an
extreme inconvenience. It has therefore occurred to me as a
subject highly deserving attention, whether the judicial office
of Chancellor, under the title of Master of the Rolls, or ViceChancellor, might not advantageously be committed, for the
present, either to the Chief Justice, or to one of the inferior
judges of the Court of King's Bench. An arrangement of this
nature might, if necessary, form the basis of some systematic
arrangement in future times.
"Your Excellency'is aware that a similar measure has been
adopted in Nova Scotia, 28 and that under a recent act of Parliament, a system very similar has been introduced into the Court
of Exchequer in England.
"You will consider, and report to me whether this measure,
or any modification of it, could be conveniently adopted in Upper Canada."
The foregoing, together with some later despatches on the
same subject and the reports thereon by the judges, the AttorneyGeneral and the Solicitor-General of the Province, were laid before the legislative assembly onthe 19th of February, 1828.24 Two
of the three judges of the King's Bench (Campbell, C. J., and
Sherwood, J.) expressed themselves in favour of the erection of a
new court with general equitable jurisdiction under a separate
judge who would give his whole time to the administration of
equity, but, if it should be thought desirable that equitable jurisdiction should be exercised through the existing Court of King's
Bench, they considered it preferable that there should be conferred, not upon one but upon all the members of the court, a
limited equitable jurisdiction, that is, a jurisdiction confined to
specified subjects comprised within the general jurisdiction of the
English Court of Chancery.
One of the judges made a separate report unequivocally
favouring the complete separation of the courts of law and equity
respectively. This was John Walpole Willis, a member of the
English equity bar, who .in 1827 had been the bearer of the des" For a full account 'fthe Court of Chancery in Nova Scotia, see a
series of articles by Charles J. Townsend in 20 CANADIAN LAw Tzmzs, pp.
14, 37, 74, 105 (Jan.-April, xgoo).
LE . Ass. U. C. (1828), pp. 55 ff., where the despatches
'See JouRwA
and reports are printed.
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patch above mentioned as well as of a royal warrant directing

his appointment as a judge of the Court of King's Bench, in the
expectatioft that he would later be appointed to preside over the
new court of equity when it should be established, and who by
letters patent under the great seal of the Province, dated the
27 th of September, 1827, had been appointed to the King's
Bench.u
The Attorney-General, John Beverley Robinson, agreed
that if a large equitable jurisdiction was to be exercised, especially if it was to include the administration of trusts, it would
be preferable to confer such jurisdiction upon a judge in equity
sitting in a distinct court and having no connection with any
other court. He was in favour, however, of introducing equity
only to a limited extent rather than of creating a general equitable jurisdiction which might not be suitable in all respects to
the condition of the province.
No action was taken by the legislative assembly in 1828 on
the proposal for the creation of an equitable jurisdiction beyond
the adoption of a resolution that owing to the pressure of other
business it was impracticable during the present session to bestow upon the subject the mature consideration which its importance demanded. 26 The proposal was discussed at .subsequent
sessions, but no statute was passed on the subject in the interval
between 1828 and 1837.
In the event Mr. Justice Willis was not destined to become the head of a court of equity in Upper Canada, and the
circumstances under which his judicial career in the Province
came to an end tended to complicate the consideration of the
question of the establishment of the court. The new judge was
very soon in open conflict with the Attorney-General on the subject of the institution and conduct of criminal prosecutions. In
June, 1828, he refused to sit in a court composed of himself and
"Not many years after this the British government ceased to issue war-

rants for the appointment of judges or other officers connected with the

administration of justice in Upper Canada.
'JOURNAL LEG. Ass. U. C. (1828), p. ico. Notwithstanding the urgent
need of a court of equity, there was in tact a good deal of opposition to its
establishment, which is not disclosed by the official records.
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the senior puisne judge of the King's Bench, because he contended that under the Statute 34 G. 3, C. 2, the court was not
legally constituted in the absence of the chief justice. 27 By letters patent dated the 26th of June, 1828, he was summarily dismissed from office, the only reason given being expressed concisely in the recital:
"Whereas for- good cause, we have found it necessary to
amove the said John Walpole Willis from the said office."2*
On the 23rd of December, 1832, a select committee made a
report to the assembly, appending to its report a draft bill for
the establishment of a court of chancery. 29 The committee
stated that the chief cause of the delay in the establishment of
the court had been the apprehension which was felt as to the
heavy expense which the court would entail, but after enumerating the many classes of cases in regard to which the lack of an
equitable jurisdiction amounted to a denial of justice, the committee urged the immediate creation of a separate court of
equity, recommending that in the first instance its jurisdiction
should be limited to cases of obvious and paramount necessity,
" The statute provided that "His Majesty's Chief Justice of this Province
together with two Puisne Justices, shall preside in the said Court." The
Privy Council ultimately decided that Willis was wrong in his law. Some
account of Willis can be found in an article by Mr. Justice Riddell in 49
CANADA LAw JOURNAL, 126 (March, xg3).
'The proceedings relating to the amoval of Mr. Justice Willis are set
out in detail in a report made by a select committee to the assembly on
the 2nd of March, 1829 (JOURNAL, appendix, page 20). Tn March, 1828, the
assembly had already adopted an address to the King asking that the chief
justice of the Province should cease to have a seat in the executive council
and that the judges should be rendered independent by being appointed
during good behaviour instead of during the pleasure of the Crown. To
this address an unsatisfactory answer was made at the session of z829
(JOURNAL, page 16). Meanwhile the general question of the terms of the
tenure of judicial office had become involved with the particular case of
Willis, and on the 14th of March, 1829, the assembly by a vote of twenty-nine
to twelve adopted an address to the King, couched in terms of earnest
remonstrance, on the subject of the administration of justice in the Province,
asking for the reinstatement of Willis in addition to the reforms already
asked for in the address of i828 (JOURNAL [1829], page 6o). At the session
of i83o the Lieutenant-Governor merely stated that this address had been
laid before the King. A select committee on the administration of justice
referred in its report to the "extraordinary and unexpected facts" that the
persons who had been most active in the removal of Willis had meanwhile
been elevated to higher offices-the Attorney-General promoted to the offices
of chief justice, executive councillor, legislative councillor and speaker of the
legislative council, an executive councillor promoted to a judgeship, the
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and that it should be left to the legislature to add to the powers
of the court from time to time as experience should show
to be safe and necessary. The committee reported against
the alternative proposal which has been already mentioned,
namely, that the King's Bench should be invested with
equitable jurisdiction, on the ground that in a few years
the blending of legal and equitable powers might be
found to be inconvenient, and that it was better to provide from
the first for a separate court on a permanent basis. In the light
of subsequent statutes which in Ontario culminated in 188i in
the complete fusion of the administration of law and equity in
one court, 0 it is of course easy to criticise the legislators of Upper Canada for not being wiser than those of England, but it is
clear now that an obvious opportunity was lost of anticipating
the great reforms of procedure which in later days on both-sides
of the Atlantic have to a large extent abolished the artificial separation of courts of law and courts of equity.
Some light is thrown upon the conditions under which an
equitable jurisdiction was introduced in Upper Canada by a
pamphlet, now scarce, written in 1847 by John Godfrey Spragge,
afterx .rds Chancellor of Upper Canada, entitled "A Letter on
the subject of the Courts of Law of Upper Canada addressed
to the Attorney General and Solicitor General." There was at
that time some talk of abolishing the equitable jurisdiction,
which had been in existence for about ten years. The following
Solicitor-General to the office of attorney-general, and Mr. Justice Hagerman, who had replaced Willis on the bench, to the office of solicitor-general
(JOURNAL [183o], page 196).
On the 5th of March, 183o, the assembly
adopted an address to the Lieutenant-Governor requesting him to call the
attention of the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the address of the preceding session. In 1831 a more gracious answer was received in the form of
a message from the Lieutenant-Governor that he had received the command
of the King to propose a bill declaring that the commissions of the judges
should be granted during their good behaviour. In 1834 the statute 4 W. 4
c. 2, to this effect, was passed. The Governor also informed the house that
no judge would in future be appointed as a member of the executive or legislative council, with the exception of the Chief Justice of Upper Canada. This
solitary exception disappeared after i84o (Robinson, C. J., having already
voluntarily ceased to exercise his rights in this respect).
'JoURNAL
I.zG. Ass. U. C. (1832-3), page 66, and appendix, page 79.
"The Ontario Judicature Act, i88r, was an adaptation to Ontario of
the English Judicature Acts of 1813 and 1875.
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paragraphs from the pamphlet may be appropriately quoted
here:
"There are those who say we may safely abolish equitable
jurisdiction, for we did very well without it before the Court of
Chancery was established. I take leave to deny both the conclusion and the premises. The want of equitable jurisdiction was
much felt, and considering the many cases in which remedial
justice is administered in equity, it is impossible that it could be
otherwise. No stronger evidence is needed of the want of such
a jurisdiction having been felt than the circumstance of an act
being passed to introduce it, as a part of the law which without
it was imperfect, and in many instances worked injustice. It
was from no love of a Court of Chancery that it was introduced,
but in spite of many and strong prejudices.
"Its introduction was necessary for another reason, vi.,
to preserve the common law. The common law was never
meant, nor is it calculated, by itself to form the jurisprudence
of a country. "Without being tempered by equity law, it would
often work injustice, and in its actual operation the application
of its rules did work injustice, until a language began to be used
in our Court of King's Bench which would have sounded
strangely in the ear of a common lawyer in England. What was
called the equitable jurisdktion of the court was not unfrequently appealed to as absolutely necessary, in the absence of a
Court of Equity, to correct the rigour of the common law; a
more dangerous doctrine could scarcely be broached, or one
more calculated to subvert the common law itself. There are
judges whose bent of mind would incline them to strain the
common law rather than that a flagrant injustice should be committed, by applying its rules in their integrity to the case before
them--'to do a great good, do a little wrong.' The temptation
to do so flowing from a love of justice and a hatred of wrong,
would not always be resisted. Thus, by degrees the common
law would cease to be what it is and ought to be-a system of
law built up upon precedent and authority-so that a man may,
with reasonable certainty, know what the law is, and govern
himself accordingly; but it would degenerate into an uncertain
hybrid system, neither common law nor equity, but an incongruous compound of both, so that no man could tell what his
rights were, inasmuch as they would, in so great a measure, depend upon the half-legal half-equitable view which the judge or
judges might take of them.
"The law would soon deserve a reproach such as Selden
applied to the Court of Chancery in his time: 'In law we have
a measure, and know what to trust to. Equity is according to
the conscience of him that is Chancellor; and as that is larger or
narrower so is equity. 'Tis all one, as if they should take the
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standard for the measure, the Chancellor's foot. What an uncertain measure this would be! One Chancellor has a long foot,
another a short foot, a third an indifferent foot. It is the same
thing with the Chancellor's conscience.' For the word equity,
substitute law, and for the word Chancellor, substitute judges,

and you have a quaint but forcible and true description of what
our law would become."
By the Chancery Act,

1

passed on the 4th of March, 1837,

there was established a court of equity to be known as The Court
of Chancery for the Province of Upper Canada, of which the
Governor should be chancellor, and for the better administration of justice in the said court it was enacted that the judicial
powers thereof, both legal and equitable, should be exercised by
a judge to be known as "the Vice-Chancellor of Upper Canada."
It was provided (by Section Two) that the said court "shall
have jurisdiction, and possess the like power and authority as by
the laws of England are possessed by the Court of Chancery in
England, in respect of the matters hereinafter enumerated," that
is to say, in all cases of fraud; in all matters relating to trusts,
executors and administrators, and mortgages; in all matters relating to infants, idiots and lunatics, and their estates, except
where special provision had been made or might thereafter be
made with respect to them by any law of the Province; in all
matters relating to awards; to compel the specific performance of
agreements; to compel the discovery of concealed papers or evidence, or such as might be wrongfully withheld from the party
claiming the benefit of the same; to prevent multiplicity of suits
and to stay proceedings in a court of law prosecuted against
equity and good conscience; to decree the issue of letters patent
from the Crown to rightful claimants; to institute proceedings
for the repeal of letters patent erroneously or improvidently issued; to stay waste; in all cases of accident; in all cases of ac2
count; and in all cases relating to co-partnership.'
It was further provided by Section Six that the rules of decision should be the same as governed the Court of Chancery in
=7 -,.4, C.2, an Act to establish a Court of Chancery in this Province.
" See the Revised Statutes of Ontario (1897), c. 5i, s.26, in force as of
the date of the original act, the 4 th of March, 1837.
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England, and that the court should possess full power and
authority to enforce and compel obedience to its orders, judgments and decrees to the same extent as was possessed by the
Court of Chancery in England, in respect of all matters within
its jurisdiction, except when otherwise provided by the laws of
the Province.83
The effect of this act was to introduce the rules of the
English Court of Chancery as of the 4th of Mard, 1837. If.
these rules had been affected in England by any statute passed in
the interval between 1792 and x837, such statute was apparently
brought into force in Upper Canada to the extent to which it
affected the rules of the Court of Chancery, notwithstanding that
in other respects only so much of the British statute law was in
force in the Province as had been enacted in England prior to
the i5th of October, 1792, and as was supposed to be suitable to
the then condition of the Province. 4 For instance, in In re
Hodges,35 an order directing a conveyance of mortgaged premises by an infant heir was made by the Court of Chancery in Upper Canada by virtue of an enabling statute passed in England
in 183o. This statute having been passed in England since the
introduction of the law of England into Upper Canada would
have had no force in the Province apart from the Chancery Act
of 1837.
Provision was also made by the Chancery Act for appeals
from the Court of Chancery to the existing appellate court consisting of the governor or chief justice and any two or more
members of the executive council of the Province, with further
right of appeal to the King in council, as in the case of judgments of the Court of King's Bench.38 The vice-chancellor was
declared to be a member of the court of appeal (Section
Thirteen), and, in the case of appeals from the vice-chancellor
Cf. R. S. 0. (1897), c. 51, s. 27.
Subject, of course, to the provisions of any statute passed in England
and made applicable by its terms to Upper Canada, and subject to provincial
legislation since 1792.

"(x85o) i Grant, 285.
6.
'Section
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the pui.ne judges of the Court of King's Bench were added as
members. 7
With regard to mortgages the legislature added to the general grant of equitable jurisdiction the following provision:38
"And whereas the law of England was at an early period
introduced into this Province, and has continued to be the rule
of decision in all matters of controversy relative to property and
civil rights; while at the same time, from want of an equitable
jurisdiction, it has not been in the power of mortgagees to fore-close, and mortgagors, being out of possession, have been unable
to avail themselves of their equity of redemption; and, in consequence of the want of those remedies, the rights of the respective parties, or of their heirs, executors, administrators or assigns, may be found to be attended with peculiar equitable considerations, as well as in regard to compensation for improvenients, as in respect to the right to redeem, depending on the
circumstances of each case, and a strict application of the rules
established in England, might be attended with injustice; be it
therefore enacted by the authority aforesaid, That the ViceChancellor of the said Court shall have power and authority in
all cases of mortgage, where before the passing of this Act the
-estate has become absolute in law, by failure in performing the
condition, to make such order or decree in respect to foreclosure
or redemption, and with regard to compensation for improvements, and generally with respect to the rights and claims of
the mortgagor and mortgagee, and their respective heirs, executors, administrators or assigns, as may appear to him just and
reasonable under all the circumstances of the case, subject however to the appeal provided by this Act."
The leading case on the section just quoted is that of
Snyth v. Simpson."9 This was a suit for the redemption of a
mortgage brought in I84o by the devisees of the mortgagor
against the successors in title of the mortgagees. The mortgage
was made in x8io and came due in x8i . Nothing was ever-paid
on account of the mortgage, and in i819 judgment was recovered
for the mortgage debt. In z825 the mortgagor was still in possession, but about that time, the land having been put up for sale
'Section 17.

M7 W. 4. e. 2. 3. I.
(1859) 7 Moo. P. C. 2o, affirming (1847) 1 U. C. E. &A. 172.
Even in this the vice-chancellor was wrong. There is no absolute rule

that a mortgagor is entitled to redeem in equity if the circumstances render
it inequitable that he should be allowed to redeem, even though the statutory
period of limitation has not expired.
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by the sheriff under a writ of execution, the mortgagor gave up
possession to the defendants, whose title thereupon became absolute at law. Prior to the filing of the bill for redemption the defendants, treating the land as their own, had made many sales of
parts of the land and had improved other parts.
The vice-chancellor, before whom the case came on for
hearing in the first instance, was of opinion, notwithstanding all
the circumstances adverse to the plaintiffs' claim, that under the
statute of 1837 the court had no jurisdiction to refuse redemption, it being a case in which the mortgagor would be entitled to
redeem in England,40 and that the only discretion conferred was
that of imposing terms of redemption different from those that
would have been imposed in England. In placing this construction upon the statute, the vice-chancellor overlooked, however,
the special circumstances which were recited as the very inducement to the enactment and which made it impossible to say that
any case could have arisen in England in regard either to foreclosure or to redemption where the circumstances were similar,
because no English chancellor, since equities of redemption were
first talked of, had ever had to decide what it might be just to do
in a case of mortgage where many years had elapsed after forfeiture without a court of equity to which application might be
made.4 1 On appeal, the opinion of the vice-chancellor received
the support of two out of four members of the court of the governor and council, 42 but after reargument before a court differently constituted the decree was reversed, the court being unanimously of the opinion that although twenty years had not elapsed
since the mortgagor went out of possession, there was jurisdiction to refuse redemption in the discretion of the court and that
under the circumstances the plaintiffs ought not to be allowed to
redeem. 43 A further appeal to the Queen in council was dismissed."
U
U. C. E. & A., at p. 71.
(1846) 1 U. C. E. & A. 9; 2 U. C. 0. S. 162; sub nom. Simpson v.
Smyth.
. (1847) i U. C. E. & A. 172; 2 U. C. 0. S. 629.
"(1859) 7 Moo. P. C. 2o5; s Grant, zo4.
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In the meantime the constitution of the Canadas had undergone an important change. By a statute of the United Kingdom
commonly known as the Union Act of 184o, 4s the Queen in
council was authorized to declare by proclamation that the two
Provinces of Upper Canada and Lower Canada should form one
Province under the name of the Province of Canada. A proclamation was issued for this purpose and the union took effect on
the ioth of February, x841."

By the Union Act there was constituted one legislative
council and one legislative assembly for the Province of Canada,
by the advice and consent of which the Queen was authorized to
make laws for the peace, welfare and good government of the
province.47 Until otherwise provided by act of the new legislature, the judicial authority formerly vested in the governor and
executive council of each of the separate provinces was vested
in the governor and executive council of Canada." In other respects and except in so far as they were inconsistent with the
changes made by the act, all existing laws, statutes and ordinances remained in force, and all courts of civil and criminal jurisdiction continued in the exercise of their powers, as if the two
provinces had not been united, subject to alteration by statute of
the legislature of Canada."
By statutes of the Province of Canada passed in 1849 the
superior courts of law and equity in Upper Canada were reorganized.50 In place of the provision of the statute of 1837 under which the judicial powers of the Court of Chancery were exercised by a single vice-chancellor it was enacted that the court
should be presided over by a chief judge to be called the Chan3 & 4 V., c. 35, an Act to re-unite the Provinces of Upper and Lower
Canada, and for the Government of Canada.
"The names Upper Canada and Lower Canada continued to be used in
reference to the parts of the new Province formerly bearing those names
respectively, although in some of the statutes of the Province of Canada
the term "Canada West" was used in reference to Upper Canada.
'Section 3.
'Section 44.
'Sections 46 and 47.
"In this year 1849 the county system was substituted for the old district
system in Upper Canada, the county thus becoming the centre for the inferior
V
courts and for other judicial purposes.
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cellor of Upper Canada who was to have rank and precedence
next to the Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench, and that
there should be two additional judges to be called vice-chancellors. 5 1
A new court to be called the Court of Common Pleas was
also established, consisting of a Chief Justice with rank and precedence next to the Chancellor of Upper Canada and two puisne
justices. 5 2 Upon this court was conferred a jurisdiction identical
with that possessed by the existing Court of Queen's Bench, and
it was provided hat in the first instance two puisne judges should
be transferred to the new court from the Court of Queen's
Bench, which was thus reduced to a chief justice and two puisne
judges, as originally constituted. 5"
The total number of judges having been increased by the
statutes above mentioned from six to nine, advantage was taken
of the opportunity to establish a new "Court of Error and Appeal" which it was considered would afford a more satisfactory
appellate tribunal than the old court of the governor and council. 54
All the judges of the three superior courts of law and
equity were constituted members of the new appellate court,
which was to be presided over by the Chief Justice of the Court
of Queen's Bench, or in his absence by the judge who should be
next entitled to precedence, 5 and appeals were authorized to be
brought from any of the three superior courts, with a right of
further appeal in certain cases to the Queen in council.5 6
By a statute commonly known as the Dormant Equities Act,
passed in x855,1 7 restrictions were placed upon the right to disturb existing legal titles by the assertion of equitable claims re12 V., c. 64, s. 1 and:&
*12 V., c. 63.
*By 7 W. 4, c. i, as already noted, two puisne judges had been added
to the Court of King's Bench. In 1837, on the accession of Victoria to the
throne, the name of the court was changed to "The Court of Queen's
Bench."
. 12 V., C. 63, §§ 37 and 3.
" Ibid., §39.
! *Ibid., §§ 4o and 46.
61x8 V.. c. xzr, an Act to amend the law as to Dormant Equities. The
terms of the statute are not clear, but of course it has long since spent its
force.
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lating to real estate arising prior to 1837, in the absence of fraud
on the part of the legal owner, pLnd a discretionary power was
given to the C6urt of Chancery to give effect to any other equitable claim arising prior to 1837 provided suit was brought
within twenty years from the time when the equitable claim
arose.
On the zoth of June, 1857 , an act 58 was passed "for further
increasing the efficiency and simplifying the proceedings of the
Court of Chancery." By the first section it was enacted that
the court should thereafter:
"possess the like power, authority and jurisdiction as the Court
of Chancery in England possesses, as a court of equity, to administer justice in all cases in. which there may be no adequate
remedy at law; provided always that nothing herein shall be
held to impair or diminish the jurisdiction heretofore conferred
by law on the said court."
On the z8th of March, 1865, it was'enacted 59 that:
"the Court of Chancery in Upper Canada shall have the same
equitable jurisdiction in matters of revenue as the Court of Exchequer in England possesses."
The Court of Chancery in Upper Canada had thus acquired
a complete equitable jurisdiction, and all.the superior courts of
original jurisdiction had assumed the form under which they
continued until the Judicature Act of i88i. Long before the
last mentioned date, however, some equitable powers had been
conferred on the courts of common law and some powers forinerly peculiar to courts of common law had been conferred on
the court of equity. The process by which the jurisdiction of the
courts of common law and that of the court of equity became to
an increasing extent concurrent, and which ended in the consolidation of all the superior courts in one Supreme Court of Judicature for Ontario administering both common law and equity, is
not within the scope of this paper.
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